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Abstract 
 
This paper applies a real option framework to suggest that the takeover premia in mergers 
and acquisitions can be influenced by (a) the pre-bid ownership of target and (b) the real 
option characteristics of both acquirer and target firms. Our findings show that pre-bid 
ownership reduces the takeover premia, which is consistent with the argument that pre-bid 
ownership reduces information asymmetry. However, we find that the takeover premia is 
higher when both the acquirer and target firms exhibit real option capacity as measured by 
positive risk-return sensitivity. As a result, an acquirer with real option capacity is willing to 
pay higher takeover premia for an option embedded in the target firm. 
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1. Introduction 
Reflecting the importance of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in shaping the modern 
corporation, a voluminous literature has emerged investigating the determinants of takeover 
premia offered in M&As (higher purchase price in comparison to the current market value of 
target firm).1 These determinants include managerial motivations (Amihud and Lev, 1981), 
agency costs (Seth et al., 2002), acquiring and target firms’ characteristics (Denis et al., 2002), 
regulations (Rossi and Volpin, 2004), international taxation (Huizinga et al., 2012), and other 
merging firms- and deal-specific features (for a review, see Sudarsanam, 2010). These 
studies offer compelling evidence regarding the impact of several important factors on the 
distribution of takeover premia offered in M&As. However, in this paper we suggest an 
important aspect, that has received limited attention, relates to the impact of several 
dynamics embedded on real option characteristics of the firms. We argue that this can 
significantly affect the takeover premia. 
The ‘real option’ perspective is not new in the capital investment literature. There has 
been awareness that many of the investment ‘decisions under uncertainty’ can be viewed as 
real option problems (Copeland and Antikarov, 2001; Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2001). Along 
these lines, the real option analysis has been applied in investments such as R&D (Mitchell 
and Hamilton, 1988), emerging markets (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994), and natural resource 
investments (Morck et al., 1989; Bjerksund and Ekern, 1990), among others. Relating real 
options to M&As is also not new in the academic literature (Bruner, 2004). In particular, 
Smith and Triantis (1995) point out that the target firm may have growth options that the 
acquiring firm may consider as very valuable. Through a series of acquisitions of small 
                                                             
1 For a review of these studies see Eckbo (2009). 
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fractions of the target firm, acquirers can develop a collection of growth options that allows 
them to further enhance their competitive position. Agliardi et al. (2016) present a model 
that leverage ratios increase in M&As that create significant new growth options. In the 
empirical tests of their trade-off model of leverage changes in M&As they find that leverage 
increases in merging firms that create significantly larger growth options. 
We are motivated to extend further the real option in M&As by connecting two main 
arguments. First, we rely on Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) who suggest that alliances with a 
target allows potential bidders to gain sufficient information in the pre-acquisition period in 
order to know what they are buying. This contention is similar to arguments suggesting that 
strategic alliances and joint ventures in foreign direct investment are effective tools for firms 
to acquire “time-to-build” real options aiming to tackle environmental and social uncertainty. 
Environmental uncertainty stems from the lack of information about the market 
environment, and social uncertainty is the lack of understanding of the partner’s attitude 
towards the alliance (Tong et al., 2008; McCarter et al., 2011). 2 We believe that this idea can 
also be extended in M&As, as acquirers are concerned about whether their future investment 
in targets will yield a sufficiently high return (environmental uncertainty) based on the 
acquisition price (i.e. takeover premia and the post-acquisition integration), information 
asymmetry in the M&A process, as well as their unfamiliarity with the targets management 
(social uncertainty). Acquirers could get access to previous unavailable internal information 
                                                             
2 Time-to-build options are embedded in investment projects in which firms choose a contingent plan for 
making sequential expenditure by constantly learning from new information (Majd and Pindyck, 1987). 
Uncertainty determines the value of time-to-build real options and further affects firms’ decision of how much 
ownership to acquire and how they will develop their stake (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; Folta and Miller, 
2002). Folta and Miller (2002) show that acquisition of majority stakes is more likely in the presence of lower 
uncertainty as acquirers would prefer partial acquisitions rather than commit to large irreversible investment 
when faced with greater uncertainties and information asymmetry. 
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by achieving a pre-ownership stake in the target (i.e., toehold). As a result, this stake may 
help them to develop a relation with the target management (possibly including their views 
on the M&As), which should resolve social uncertainty. As new information arrives and 
information asymmetry is gradually reduced, and acquirers have the flexibility to halt, 
abandon or expand their investment in the target firm. For instance, Wong (2009) shows that 
the existence of an abandonment option can affect a firm's investment decision.3 Therefore, 
acquirers use pre-bid ownership to obtain time-to-build real options in order to mitigate 
environmental and social uncertainty that exists in a full takeover. There is some debate in 
the literature on the effects of acquirers’ toehold and takeover premia in M&As. Betton and 
Eckbo (2000) suggest that pre-bid ownership reduces competition and target resistance, 
which leads to a lower takeover premia offered to the target. We suggest that the reason the 
pre-bid ownership reduces competition, target resistance as well as offer premia, is related 
to the real option imbedded in the pre-bid ownership. Pereira and Rodrigues (2019) develop 
a dynamic real options model for the timing and terms of mergers. Under perfect information, 
they find that the merger terms must depend on the negotiating power of each firm.  As pre-
bid ownership effectively makes the acquirer an insider with access to information and 
knowledge of the management and decision making of the target firm. This should lead to 
the possibility of negotiating a better deal and being able to assess more accurately the 
takeover premia.4   
Second, we develop arguments along those in Bradley et al. (1988) who suggest that 
                                                             
3 Shibata and Wong (2019) further show that a firm can determine the optimal investment timing when the 
costly reversible ratio of investment at the time of stopping the project can be determined. 
4 It is also possible that the potential acquirer could conclude that the subsequent acquisition is no longer 
attractive and can choose to abandon the M&As project. However, our study does not cover this research 
direction. 
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synergistic value created in takeovers depends on how the acquirer can capitalize on the 
combined investment opportunities. Following this, Grullon et al. (2012) argue that in the 
majority of M&As acquirers are buying the growth options of the target and hold flexibility 
in deploying resources to develop the acquired growth options. They suggest that investment 
or growth opportunities and the real option value are positively related. They develop a real 
option measure based on sensitivity of firm level stock return to volatility changes. If a firm 
has more real options, it will take advantage of the higher volatility, leading to greater 
sensitivity of stock return to volatility changes. We also connect this to Bena and Li (2014) 
who suggested that firms with a technological overlap (like-buys-like) have a higher 
probability to be involved in M&As. We use target and acquirer characteristics to construct a 
real option measure related to merger-pair and examine its effect on the takeover premia, 
based on Grullon et al. (2012) and Bena and Li (2014).  Therefore, contrary to the effect of 
the pre-bid ownership stake, we expect that if both acquirer and target in a merger matched-
pair contain a positive real option, this should have a positive influence on the takeover 
premia offered to the target. 
We contribute to the literature by analysing if, and if so to what extent, real options in 
the M&A process influence the takeover premia offered to the target through two real option 
related characteristics, namely: (a) pre-bid ownership stake, and (b) acquirer and target firm 
level characteristics including the risk-return sensitivity of merger matched-pairs and the 
technological overlap (referred to as like-buys-like). We argue that pre-bid ownership (i.e., 
toehold, which is defined as prior percentage of ownership) can be viewed as a form of real 
option and the subsequent acquisition of the target is the exercise of the real option. 
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We conjecture that pre-bid ownership is a form of real option and the subsequent 
acquisitions as evidence of exercising such a real option is supported by Smith and Triantis 
(1995). Acquirers use pre-bid ownership to obtain time-to-build real options in order to 
mitigate environmental uncertainty and social uncertainty in a full takeover. Consequently, 
we expect that our measure of pre-bid ownership as a form of time-to build real option is 
negatively related to the takeover premia. Grullon et al. (2012) provides us with a proxy for 
the level of real options within a firm. They find that the positive relationship between the 
firm level stock return to changes in volatility is due to the real options held by the firm. The 
more real option the firm hold, the higher the sensitivity coefficient of firm level stock return 
to changes in volatility is. Therefore, the sensitivity coefficient can serve as a measurement 
proxy for the firm’s real option level. With this measurement of real options, it becomes 
feasible to investigate how the real option level of the acquirer and target will affect the 
transaction incidence and how the acquirer and target will match with each other. 
In terms of the sensitivity of statistical properties of takeover premia to the target firm’s 
domicile, it has been shown that compared to domestic acquirers, foreign acquirers (i.e. 
acquirers engaged in cross-border acquisitions (CBA)) offer a higher takeover premia to their 
targets (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991).5 The literature also shows that, due to the differences 
in culture, management style, and product market condition across countries, social 
uncertainty and environmental uncertainties are larger in CBA than in domestic 
counterparts. These findings suggest that CBAs are an interesting sample of takeovers to 
investigate whether, and to what extent, our real option arguments relate to takeover premia 
                                                             
5 Such excess premia is often considered as one of the reasons for the decline in acquirers’ value around CBA 
announcements (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). 
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offered in domestic versus foreign target M&As. 
Our findings add to the evidence on the determinants of the takeover premia offered in 
M&As by providing insights into (a) the role of real options in the form of pre-bid ownership 
and (b) the positive risk-return sensitivity of the acquiring and target firms. First, we find 
there is a lower takeover premia offered in M&As where there was a pre-bid ownership stake. 
This is consistent with our conjecture that through gaining a pre-bid ownership acquirers 
are buying a real option which reduces information asymmetry by which enabling them to 
gain access to privileged information and familiarity with senior management of the target 
firm. If the information gained through the pre-bid target ownership is valuable in assessing 
the post-acquisition value of the firm, the acquirer will exercise their option as it allows them 
to ‘negotiate’ for a lower premia for their target firms and/or pay a price that is more 
reflective of the true value of the target under the control of acquirer. Secondly, we find that 
the takeover premia is higher when both the acquirer and target exhibit positive risk-return 
sensitivity. This supports our view that merger pairs with positive real options are expected 
to generate additional value, leading to the buyer paying a higher premia. In the literature 
there are both theoretical models and empirical evidence on the cross-sectional variation in 
merger gains around M&As, but only a limited number of papers study these effects in 
relation to real options (an exception is Agliardi et al. 2016). Our results provide an 
additional contribution to this debate. When we consider foreign target versus domestic 
target M&As we find that, consistent with other studies, there is a higher takeover premia in 
foreign target than domestic target M&As. Surprisingly, given the higher level of potential 
uncertainty in CBAs than domestic deals, there is no significant difference between CBA and 
domestic M&As where the acquirer has an initial stake in the target or when they have 
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positive return sensitivity. 
In considering the possible joint effect of our two real option variables our results 
suggest that the pre-bid ownership reduces the takeover premia. Conversely, we find that 
real option intensive acquirers pay a higher premia for the real option intensive target. 
Combing these results, we argue that a real option intensive acquirer will pay higher premia 
to buy option-intensive target than to buy non-option intensive target, whereas the pre-bid 
ownership stake on the target seems to effectively moderate the higher takeover premia in 
the subsequent acquisition of the same target. Therefore, as we apply the real option 
arguments to both domestic and foreign target M&As we add to the many papers on the 
determinants of the takeover premia in M&As. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss our real 
option measures and develop our research questions. Section 3 describes the data and the 
research method and section 4 presents our results. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Real Options Measures and Research Questions 
Before we outline our research questions, in this section we describe the real option 
measures that we use in our analysis based on time-to-build options and the growth 
opportunities in the like-buys-like setting. 
 
2.1. Real option measures 
2.1.1. Time-to-build real options 
A time-to-build option reflects the flexibility of buying more time to better position a real 
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investment decision such as entering a market or producing a good.6 It involves and depends 
on other firm specific, industry specific, as well as market-wide factors. The real option 
literature has focused on the modeling of time-to-build options. For instance, Majd and 
Pindyck (1987) explore the real option aspect in terms of time-to-build flexibility which takes 
advantage of new information arrival in a continuous fashion after the project begins. 
Subsequently, Milne and Whalley (2000) correct the time-to-build model of Majd and 
Pindyck (1987) by adding back the optimality condition in the analysis, which leads to the 
conclusion that a “naï ve” NPV rule can sometimes be an appropriate initial guide to make 
investment decision. Similarly, Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998) construct a theoretical model for 
a two-stage sequential investment where time-to-build is considered. Agliardi and Koussis 
(2013) focus on the dynamic relationship between capital structure (i.e. the use of leverage) 
and the effect of time-to-build option on firm value. Their simulation result indicates that 
time-to-build has a significant impact on firm value for certain parameter values of debt 
choices. 
Along these lines, Eckbo (2009) provides an extensive review of takeover studies 
including the effect of toehold strategies, which can be interpreted as an application of time-
to-build option. Previous studies show that companies engaging in strategic alliances and 
joint ventures to acquire time-to-build real option to tackle environmental uncertainty and 
social uncertainty (Tong et al., 2008; McCarter et al., 2011). Acquirers obtain the time-to-
build option when they make partial acquisitions. Time-to-build option is embedded in 
investment projects in which firm choose a contingent plan for making sequential 
                                                             
6 Time-to-build, reflecting the time it takes for the completion of a project, characterizes many 
investment decisions and exists at different intensities, depending on the industry the firm operates.   
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expenditures by constantly learning from the new information (Majd and Pindyck, 1987). 
Acquirers are therefore gaining access to previously unavailable internal information by 
acquiring even a small number of shares of the target. As new information arrives and 
uncertainty about the cooperation prospects and market conditions are gradually resolved, 
acquirers may have the flexibility to halt, abandon or even expand its investments in the 
target company. Acquirers obtain the time-to-build real option by making the initial smaller 
investments (initial partial acquisition) and exercise the time-to-build real option by making 
sequential larger investments when the conditions are favorable (Li et al., 2007). Cheng, 
Heywood and Ye (2019) theoretically demonstrate that when the acquiring firm is domestic, 
a toehold can take place at any threshold for pricing control. However, if the acquirer is 
foreign, a toehold can be forestalled by a sufficiently high threshold. Such a threshold can 
improve domestic welfare and global welfare by stopping an inefficient partial acquisition. 
In the majority acquisitions, acquirers obtain the growth options of the target and hold more 
flexibility in deploying resources and developing new growth option with the target. 
Uncertainty determines the value of time-to-build real options and further affects firms’ 
decision of how much ownership to acquire and how they will expand acquisition 
sequentially (Folta and Miller, 2002; Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998). We extend this argument 
in our first real option measure by examining how pre-bid ownership (similar to previous 
arguments on toehold stakes but without limiting the initial equity ownership to a small 
percentage as the term toehold implies) can be used by bidders to obtain real options to 
mitigate the information asymmetry before they launch a majority share acquisitions. We 
argue that bidders acquire time-to-build real option in pre-bid ownership and this initial 
ownership affects the takeover premia for subsequent acquisition of the target firm. 
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2.1.2. Growth opportunity, the like–buys-like setting, and real options 
Myers (1977) suggests that corporate assets, particularly growth opportunities, can be 
viewed as call options. In other words, the opportunity to invest in a project is analogous to 
an American call option on the investment opportunity. In fact, any opportunity with a choice 
whose value depends on an underlying asset can be viewed as an option (Geske, 1979). Some 
firms can enjoy growth opportunities but lack the capital required to realize those valuable 
investment projects. In other cases, firms with compatible technological capabilities can 
create synergistic value by combining these technological advantages. Under these situations, 
an acquisition can create value. By reallocating the capital and exercising the growth options, 
both companies can achieve growth after the acquisition. These ‘financing-
motivated ’acquisitions and like-buys-like mergers are very common in industries with 
emphasis on high-technology, R&D and in innovative industries (e.g., computers and 
pharmaceuticals).  
Bena and Li (2014) suggest that firms with technological overlap have a higher 
probability to be involved in M&As. Extending this argument, the like-buys-like theory of 
M&As suggests that firms would like to purchase targets with similar technological or growth 
characteristics. Therefore, like-buys-like mergers can result in a lower takeover premia as 
the target is a more willing seller and therefore accepts a lower premia. On the other hand, 
Bradley et al. (1988) argue that synergistic value is created in technological and innovative 
M&As. In this case, it is possible for the acquirer to pay higher premia for the potential 
synergistic value. 
Our second real option measure is based on this argument and allows us to capture 
11 
 
managerial flexibility real options through the risk-return sensitivity. Grullon et al. (2012) 
show that technology and growth related real option level is reflected in the sensitivity of 
firm level stock return to volatility changes.7 They also show that a firm can benefit from 
upside business potential while reducing downside business risk through discretionary 
managerial flexibility.8 Therefore, if a firm has more real options, it is in a better position to 
take advantage of the higher volatility, leading to a bigger sensitivity of stock returns to 
volatility changes. 
In short, when the firm has a number of real options, the sensitivity coefficient in the 
return-volatility regression is positive. However, when the firm does not hold any real option, 
the coefficient can be negative and the firm’s return is mainly priced by risk factors. Therefore, 
to capture this growth opportunity in a like-buys-like setting, we identify merger pairs that 
both targets and acquirers possess real option capacity using the Grullon et al. (2012) 
method. 
 
2.2. Research questions 
We examine how real options affect the takeover premia in M&As through two real option 
related characteristics, considering both domestic and foreign target M&As. Following our 
                                                             
7 The notion of viewing investment opportunities as growth options (i.e. real options) is initially outlined by 
Myers (1977). A number of papers have relied on this idea in subsequent empirical papers. For example, 
Grenadier (1996) explores the strategic exercise of real options using real estate data and Aguerrevere (2009) 
examines the linkage between real options, product market competition, and asset returns. 
8 With the control of downside risks and realization of favorable opportunities, firms can achieve a better 
performance with better managerial flexibility. For example, Grullon et al. (2012) compare real options of firms 
with and without labor unions. Their results show that due to managerial flexibility, non-unionized firms do 
demonstrate higher risk-return sensitivity (i.e., higher real option level) than the unionized counterparts. In 
addition to the operating flexibilities, there are some other forms of flexibility. Training and learning by doing 
create a more flexible workforce, and this flexibility constitutes a valuable real option. Similarly, at corporate-
wide level, gaining more know-how creates strategic competencies that are valuable (Merton, 1998). We 
suggest that possible applications of this learning real option could include buying a minority interest in the 
target before completing the acquisition. 
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discussion above that strategic alliances and joint ventures are effective tools for companies 
to acquire time-to-build real options to tackle environmental and social uncertainty we 
extend this argument to the M&As setting. We suggest that acquirers use pre-bid ownership 
to obtain time-to-build real option in order to mitigate environmental and social uncertainty 
in a full takeover. Betton and Eckbo (2000) suggest that the expected payoff to target 
shareholders decreases in the presence of the acquirer’s toehold or initial ownership. We 
argue that this finding supports our real option conjecture that pre-bid ownership is a form 
of real option and the subsequent acquisitions as evidence of exercising such a real option. 
Consequently, we expect that our measure of pre-bid ownership as a form of time-to build 
real option is negatively related to the takeover premia. Therefore, our first hypothesis is 
stated as follows: 
 
H1: The pre-bid ownership has a negative impact on the takeover premia. 
 
For our second research question, we use Grullon et al. (2012) to suggest managerial 
flexibility and growth-related (like-buys-like) real options can be measured through firm 
level’s sensitivity of return to volatility changes. The literature suggests that growth related 
and managerial flexibility could have a positive or negative impact on the takeover premia. 
However, we expect that if we have a positive real option measure based on firm level’s 
sensitivity of return to volatility changes this should have a positive influence on the takeover 
premia.9 Therefore, in our second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
                                                             
9 The leverage hypothesis would predict a negative relation, e.g., Black (1976) and Christie (1982). However, 
we follow Grullon et al. (2012) in providing an explanation for the positive contemporaneous relation between 
firm-level returns and firm-level volatility documented in Duffee (1995). 
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H2: The real option of the merger pairs is positively related to the takeover premia. 
 
3. Data and Research Method 
3.1. Data 
Our sample consists of completed pre financial crisis M&As of US targets announced by US 
and non-US listed firms between 01/01/1985 and 31/12/2006 and recorded by the Security 
Data Corporation (SDC). In this period SDC records 59,318 M&As involving US listed targets 
within the sample period. In order for a deal to remain in the sample, it must meet the 
following criteria: first, the acquirer and the target must be US or non-US listed firms and 
have a market value of at least $1m, measured 20 and 43 days prior to the announcement of 
the deal for the acquirer and the target, respectively. To avoid small deals, the transaction 
value needs to be at least $1m. Also, as we want to study M&As clearly motivated by pre-bid 
ownership (which forms the real option that is exercised by subsequent acquisitions), we 
retain only deals for which we have the percentage of target shares acquired at the 
transaction, as well as the percentage of shares owned after the transaction. Deals for which 
the acquirers or the target are operating in regulated industry (Financials, Government and 
Agencies, and Energy and Power) are excluded for the sample. Buy-backs, repurchases, 
exchange offers, recapitalizations, privatizations, self-tender offers, spin-offs and reverse 
takeovers are excluded from the sample. To avoid the confounding effects of multiple deals, 
deals announced within 5-days surrounding another bid by the same acquirer are excluded 
from the sample. Furthermore, the daily stock price and market value of the acquirer need to 
be available from Datastream. Using this sample selection criteria results in a sample of 1,839 
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where domestic (CBA) M&As are 1,541 (298) of the deals. 
 
3.2. Research method 
3.2.1. Estimation of premia 
We define the takeover premia as difference between the deal value and the market value of 
the target. The literature also shows that target share price start increasing before the 
announcement of a bid possibly due to the rumors of the deal (Schwert, 1996). To avoid 
possible implications of such rumors on the value of the target, we take the market value of 
the target 43 days prior to the date of the announcement of the deal. Moreover, to allow for 
the implication of partial acquisition on deal value we adjust for proportion of the shares 
acquired while estimating the premia. Hence, the premia (PREM) offered to the target firm 
in an M&A is measured as in Equation (1): 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑖 = [
𝐷𝑉𝑖 − (𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−43  ×  % 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖)
𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−43 ×  % 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖
] × 100 (1) 
In equation (1) 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑖 is the premia offered to the target firm in a deal, 𝐷𝑉𝑖 is the deal 
value agreed between the acquirer and target firm and 𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖 is the market value of target 
firm 43 days prior to the date of the announcement of the deal. 
 
3.2.2. Announcement period abnormal returns for acquirer and target firms 
In line with previous studies (Fuller et al., 2002; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012) the 
short-run abnormal returns for an acquiring or target firm 𝑖 , in response to a M&A 
announcement, are estimated using the market-adjusted model, as shown in Equation (2): 
  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 (2) 
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In equation (2)  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is the abnormal return to acquirer or the target 𝑖 at day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is 
the stock return of acquirer or target 𝑖 at day 𝑡 , 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the value-weighted market return 
index (the appropriate market index where the acquirer is listed, or the S&P500 for the target) 
at day 𝑡. The announcement period Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for acquirer 𝑖 is the 
sum of the abnormal returns in a 5-day window (𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 + 2 ) surrounding the deal’s 
announcement day, 𝑡 = 0. For target 𝑖, we use 23-day window (𝑡 − 20 to 𝑡 + 2). The reasons 
are limited to the following arguments. We examine the (𝑡 − 20 to 𝑡 + 20)  CARs for both 
bidders and targets. We observe that for bidders, no pre-event run-up and the market 
reaction can be captured well using a shorter 5-day event window (as in Fuller et al., 2002). 
However, for targets, it shows a possible information leakage or market rumor affecting the 
market reaction, leading to a run-up in CAR around 20 days before the announcement. Thus 
we choose a 23-day window for target in order to capture the whole reaction. The CAR 
calculation is shown in Equation (3): 
 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇𝑛) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑛
𝑡=𝑇1
 (3) 
where 𝑇1  and 𝑇𝑛  are the first and last day of the event-window respectively,  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the 
abnormal return to acquirer or the target 𝑖 at day 𝑡 (as defined in equation 2). 
 
3.2.3. Regression model 
Following our arguments in section 3 we argue that the takeover premia can be 
explained as a function and interaction of three deal related characteristics, namely the pre-
bid equity ownership, the firm’s level risk return sensitivity of merger pairs, and the cross-
border feature of the M&As transaction. This is shown below in Equation (4). 
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 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
1 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
2 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑡−1
3 𝑑1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑡−1
4 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
5 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑡−1
6 𝑑1𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖,𝑡−1
7 𝑑1𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼
𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=8
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁 
(4) 
 
where in equation (4): the valuation variable is measured as either the premia (as in equation 
1) or the CAR (as in equation 3). Our two real option measures related to M&As are pre-bid 
ownership (PreOwn), and secondly, based on the sensitivity of stock return to changes in 
volatility capturing the level of real option within a firm (d1). The real option measures and 
other variables (such as the acquirer location and other control variables) are explained in 
great detail in the next section (3.3) and are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
3.3. Real option measures, acquirer location and control measures 
3.3.1. Real option measure – pre-bid ownership 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 is a dummy variable which is equal to one (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 = 1) when acquirer has pre-
bid ownership but not controlling interest, before the acquisition of the target and the 
acquirer takes control through the subsequent M&As, and zero otherwise (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 = 0). In 
this measure instead of measuring different types of real option directly, we infer the 
existence of real option through 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛. 
 
3.3.2. Real option measure - risk-return relation 
Based on Grullon et al. (2012), we argue that the positive relation between firm level stock 
return to changes in volatility is due to real options. The sensitivity of stock return to changes 
in volatility captures the level of real option within a firm. In traditional asset pricing 
literature (Campbell and Hentschel, 1992), it is well established that contemporaneous 
returns are negatively correlated with volatility. One possible explanation for this negative 
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relation is the ‘leverage effect’ hypothesis, which demonstrates that firms become more 
leveraged when the stock prices fall, leading to a higher volatility of stock returns. The other 
possible reason is that an increase in systematic volatility raises risk premia and expected 
future stock returns, and hence it reduces firm values, which result in the negative 
association between volatility and stock returns. In this paper, we use the sensitivity of stock 
return to changes in volatility to proxy for the firms’ technology-related real option level. 
Following Grullon et al. (2012), the sensitivity of firm value to changes in volatility is 
estimated as follows in Equation (5): 
 𝑟𝑖,𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓,𝜏 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝜏(𝑟𝑚,𝜏 − 𝑟𝑓,𝜏) + 𝛾𝑖,𝜏∆𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝜏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝜏 (5) 
where: 𝑟𝑖,𝜏 is firm level monthly stock return, 𝑟𝑓,𝜏 is monthly risk free rate; 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the value-
weighted market return index (the appropriate market index where the acquirer is listed, or 
the S&P500 for the target) at day 𝑡; volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of firm 
𝑖’s daily stock return during month 𝜏, and changes in volatility ∆𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝜏 for firm 𝑖 in month 𝜏 
is calculated as the difference between stock volatility in month 𝜏 and month 𝜏 − 1. 
The real option level (𝛾𝑖,𝑡 ) is estimated as follows. For each firm 𝑖 in month 𝑡 , we 
estimated the above time-series regression using data during months 𝜏 ∈ (𝑡 −  71, 𝑡 −
 1). The estimated coefficient on ∆𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝜏, 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 is the sensitivity of stock returns to changes in 
volatility, which serves as the measure of the individual firm’s real option level. We use a 
dummy variable, 𝑑1, to capture the like-buys-like merger motivation (Bena and Li, 2014) 
with growth related real options. We focus on M&As where both the acquirer and target have 
positive values where 𝑑1 equals to one (𝑑1 = 1) when both acquirer and target have positive 
coefficients of the return-risk sensitivity, and zero otherwise (𝑑1 = 0).  
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3.3.3. Acquirer location 
We argue that CBA can have higher uncertainty than domestic transactions due to potentially 
greater information asymmetries and cultural differences (see Barbopoulos et al., 2018). 
This uncertainty should strongly effect the takeover premia. Therefore, we include a dummy 
variable, which is assigned the value of 1 (𝐶𝐵𝐴 = 1) when the acquirer is a non-US firm, and 
the value of 0 (𝐶𝐵𝐴 = 0) when the acquirer is a US firm. Also to examine if an acquirer with 
real options could be willing to pay more for CBA, we also control for the possible joint effect 
of the two real option variables and the cross-border feature by various interaction terms (i.e. 
(a) 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 × 𝐶𝐵𝐴; (b) 𝑑1 × 𝐶𝐵𝐴; (c) 𝑑1 × 𝐶𝐵𝐴 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛). 
 
3.3.4. Control variables 
We include several known control variables from previous research that have shown to be 
strongly related to takeover premia, the impact of which is captured in the vector 𝛼𝑗  (as in 
equation 4). We include dummy variables for the industry diversification (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖) (Denis et al., 
2012; Erdorf et al., 2013), the method of payment (𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖) (Travlos, 1987; Chang and Mais, 
2000), and a multiple bids dummy (𝑀𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖 ) (Servaes, 1991). We also include continuous 
variables for the acquirer size 20 days prior to the day of the M&A announcement date 
(𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−20 ) and target size 43 days prior to the day of the M&A announcement date 
(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡−43) (Moeller et al., 2004), acquirer market-to-book value 20 days prior to the day 
of the M&A announcement date (𝐴𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡−20 ) and target market-to-book value 43 days 
prior to the day of the M&A announcement date (𝑇𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡−43)), deal size (𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑉𝑖) (Stulz et 
al., 1990), acquirer and target liquidity positions as measured by the acquirer and target cash 
ratio (cash & cash equivalents over total assets) in the most recent financial statements, 
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(𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖 and 𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖, respectively) (Barbopoulos et al., 2018), acquirer and 
target leverage positions as measured based on the acquirer and target leverage ratio (debt 
over equity) in the most recent financial statements (𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖  and 𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑉_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖 , 
respectively) (Barbopoulos et al., 2018) . More information on the definition of each variable 
and source of data can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Sample characteristics 
Table 1 illustrates the annual distribution of all, domestic, CBA with categories for focused, 
and diversifying deals, and by the payment method and pre-bid ownership. About 16% (43%) 
of the US listed targets are acquired by foreign (diversifying) acquirers. Cash payments 
dominate the acquisitions’ financing method (42%) with stock and mixed financing following 
with smaller fractions. Deals with pre-bid ownership represent about 16% of the sample. 
Figure 1 further demonstrates the time variation of the presence and absence of pre-bid 
ownership in our sample. It shows that M&As with no pre-bid ownership tend to be higher 
than those with pre-bid ownership and increased significantly during the dot com merger 
wave. 
(Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here) 
For our real option estimation based on Grullon et al. (2012) (d1) (which accounts for 
30% of the sample), this follows the merger and dot com merger waves. Table 1 shows the 
largest deals are announced during the dot com merger wave (1998 and 2002) and the 
highest takeover premia, as well as the highest abnormal returns gained by target 
shareholders, were observed during the same period. 
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Table 2 shows that the higher premia are offered to US targets from foreign acquirers 
(63.84%) rather from domestic ones (58.04%). Similarly, the abnormal returns earned by 
target shareholders are higher from foreign (33.68%) rather from domestic (28.86%) deals. 
Higher premia is also offered in mixed financed deals (68.21%), than in deals financed with 
the rest of payment methods. The level of pre-bid ownership is also found to be highly 
important in determining the premia offered to US targets. Specifically, the summary 
statistics identify a negative relation between the level of pre-bid ownership and premia, 
which is also true for target cumulative abnormal returns. To further explore how pre-bid 
ownership affect premia and abnormal returns for domestic versus CBA deals, we conduct a 
bivariate comparison in Panel B. For the first real option measure – pre-ownership (PreOwn), 
there are 14% (26%) of domestic (foreign) deals with pre-bid ownership. These figures give 
a preliminary indication that in CBA deals the use of taking an initial stake is more frequent, 
supporting the suggestion that overseas acquisitions can be more challenging in terms of 
information asymmetry and regulatory hurdles. 
For the real option measure, (d1), the merger pairs with positive real option for both 
targets and acquirers are larger for the CBA deals (38%) in comparison to their domestic 
counterparts (29%). We investigate this more fully in a multivariate framework in section 
4.3. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
The summary statistics show that domestic deals are larger than CBA ($1,170m deal 
value in domestic deals versus $918m in foreign deals) while domestic acquirers are larger 
than foreign ones ($13,961m market capitalization in domestic deals versus $10,999m in 
foreign deals). In the context of focused versus diversifying deals, while the largest deals are 
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the focused ones ($1,359m), the acquirers are larger in diversifying deals ($15,864m). 
Similarly, while mixed financed deals represent the largest ones ($1,768m) the largest 
acquirers are in cash financed deals ($16,767m). 
Table 3 records the correlations between the variables in our analysis. Noticeable 
correlations, as expected, are recorded between Target MV and Deal Value (= 96%). As a 
result we ensure that we do not include both variables simultaneously in an estimation. The 
correlation coefficients in general do not raise any concerns regarding multicollinearity that 
may make it difficult to assess the effect of independent variables in multiple regressions. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
4.2. Univariate analysis 
Table 4 reports the findings from our univariate analysis. It provides support to our first 
research question as pre-bid ownership (𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛) is associated with a lower takeover 
premia (Higgins and Rodriguez 2006). Specifically, the differential premia between the 
𝑁𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛  and 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛  subsamples is statistically (at 1% level) and economically 
(11.31%) significant (Panel A). This pattern is clearly driven by domestic (Panel B1) deals as 
there is a relatively small insignificant difference in CBA (Panel C1). In terms of abnormal 
return earned by targets during the announcement period (Panels B2 and C2), domestic 
target CARs are 29.82% for 𝑁𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 and 22.92% for 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 and CBA target CARs 
are 34.41% and 31.59% for 𝑁𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 versus 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛. These CARs indicate that pre-
bid ownerships results in a significant but smaller market reaction for both domestic and 
CBA deals. Also, CBA deals experience a bigger market reaction than the domestic one. Finally, 
the bidder CARs exhibit some interesting implications (Panels B3 and C3). First, domestic 
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bidders receive a negative and significant CAR for 𝑁𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 but a close to zero CAR for 
𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛, resulting in a negatively significant difference in CAR for the two subgroups. On 
the other hand, for CBA deals, bidders with 𝑁𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 get a small but positively significant 
CAR and 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 bidders experience a larger significant positive market reaction. Also 
the differential CAR is significant. This is interesting as the literature generally concludes that 
bidders receive zero or slightly negative announcement effect for M&As (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). In this paper, we observe a significantly positive CAR for CBA bidders, especially for 
𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 bidders. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
4.3. Multivariate analysis 
Table 5, Panel A, reports our main findings based on our regression model as defined in 
equation 4. Models (1) to (4) in Table 4 (Panel A) shows the regression results using 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎 
(as dependent variable) as the measure of takeover premia (as in equation 1). 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level across all four models, indicating that 
pre-bid ownership enables the acquirer to pay a lower premia in a subsequent acquisition. 
This is consistent with our first hypothesis predicting that the pre-bid ownership serves as a 
form of time-to-build a real option (consistent with Betton and Eckbo, 2000). In particular, 
as the pre-bid ownership enables the acquirer to potentially (a) gain privileged information 
of the target firm’s business operations through pre-bid ownership, and (b) familiarity with 
the target management, the acquirer can improve the success of the current acquisition by 
negotiating a better/accurate acquisition price that results in a lower takeover premia. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
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In testing our second hypothesis, we expect our second real option proxy (𝑑1) for both 
acquirer and target to have a positive sensitivity of return to volatility changes. Models (1) 
to (4) (Panel A) show positively significant coefficients of 𝑑1 at the 5% level (10% level in 
Model (4)). This result supports the view that when both acquirer and target contain growth 
related options, they offer a higher takeover premia which is potentially reflecting the higher 
merger synergies. Consequently, an acquirer with real options is willing to pay a higher 
takeover premia for real option-embedded target, supporting our second hypothesis. 
Therefore, following Grullon et al (2012), the argument is that a real option’s value is 
increasing in volatility of an underlying process, and thus if real options are an important 
factor in firm values, then the latter should also be positively related to volatility.  
Models (1) to (4) (Panel A) also show a significant positive relation between CBA and 
the takeover premia. This is consistent with previous evidence that CBA offer a higher 
takeover premia to targets than domestic M&As. However, when we interact CBA with pre-
bid ownership, it is no longer significant, possibly indicating that the uncertainty that is 
usually present in CBA is reduced by the information gained by holding a prior stake. 
Secondly, the real option has a higher value when information uncertainty is stronger which 
would typically be the case is for CBA (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991). Lastly, our second 
option proxy (𝑑1) is negatively related to the takeover premia if we interact with CBA but it 
is not significant. 
We deal with concerns related to the potentially endogenous firm’s choice to diversify 
internationally or not (i.e., CBA) by including the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) in our regressions. 
Specifically, the IMRs are associated with the selection equations that correspond to the 
firm’s choice to globally diversify (i.e., CBA). We therefore use a bivariate probit model with 
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sample selection to control for self-selection for the decision of CBA. For brevity, we do not 
report the parameters from the first stage (selection, or first stage) equation and also the 
parameters from the output (second stage) equation.10 Table 4, Panel B, records only the CBA 
coefficient, as well as the 𝐼𝑀𝑅 or 𝜆𝐶𝐵𝐴 coefficient in the Heckman treatment model (second 
stage equation). In Model (1) (Panel B) the coefficient on the cross-border indicator (CBA) is 
(8.394) is slightly smaller than the equivalent CBA coefficient in Model (1) (Panel A) and 
significant at the 1% level, and Lambda (𝜆𝐶𝐵𝐴) is negative and also statistically significant  
(-117.829). As the parameters of cross-border indicators in both Panels A and B appear 
similar our initial model (Panel A) could be underestimating the cross-border effect. 
Therefore factors influencing the foreign M&A could be negatively associated with the 
takeover premia. Similar effects are recorded across Models (2) to (4). 
We also consider the target and acquirer short-run market reaction to the M&A 
announcement as the dependent variable in each of the Models (5) to (12). In particular, in 
Models (5) to (8) (Table 5) the dependent variable is the target CAR while in Models (9) to 
(11) (Table 5) the equivalent is the acquirer CAR. A rich array of studies confirm that M&As 
are largely wealth-increasing for the shareholders of the target firms, but they are mostly 
wealth-destroying, or at best wealth-neutral, for the shareholders of acquirers (see Andrade 
et al., 2001; Eckbo, 2009). Similar to our results for the takeover premia, in Models (5) to (8) 
                                                             
10 The variables in the selection equation are (a) dummy variable indicating the presence of toehold, (b) d1 as 
the real option dummy (c) dummy variable indicating the presence of diversifying deal, (d) log of acquirer and 
target market value 20 and 43 days prior to the deal’s announcement day, respectively, (e) acquirer and target 
market-to-book value 20 and 43 days prior to the deal’s announcement day, respectively, (f) acquirer and target 
cash ratio (= ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets) in the most recent financial reporting to the deal’s 
announcement day, (g) acquirer and target debt-to-equity ratio (= ratio of debt to equity), (h) dummy variable 
indicating multiple bidders, (i) dummy variable indicating the presence of cash financed deals, and (j) time and 
target-industry fixed effects. The variables in the output equation are the same to those entering the selection 
equation, in addition to the CBA dummy that indicates the presence of foreign deal. Panel (B) of Table (5) report 
CBA and IMR (𝜆𝐶𝐵𝐴) coefficients. 
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𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 is significantly negative at 1% level, indicating that pre-bid ownership (having 
a real option) is negatively related to the market reaction of the target firm. As discussed 
earlier in the paper, this is consistent with our conjecture that the pre-bid ownership reduces 
the information asymmetry in the M&A and increases the familiarity of the acquirer 
management with the target management. Therefore the price paid for the target is more 
reflective/accurate of the value of the target, which is ultimately reducing the gains to target 
shareholders due to lower takeover premia. We also find a positive and significant relation 
(at 1% level) between the target CAR and our second option proxy (𝑑1) in Models (5) to (8), 
indicating that targets enjoy a positive market reaction when both merging firms possess 
real options or growth related options. Our results also show that, collectively, CBA is only 
marginally significant in the Models (5), (7) and (8) and the interaction variables between 
our real option measures and CBA are insignificant (with the exception of Model (7) where 
it is negative and marginally statistically significant). Moreover, in Model (5) (Panel B) the 
coefficient on the cross-border indicator is (2.707) is slightly smaller than the CBA equivalent 
coefficient in Model (5) (Panel A), yet statistically insignificant, and Lambda (𝜆𝐶𝐵𝐴 ) is 
negative and statistically significant (-57.729). Once again, although the parameters of cross-
border indicators appear similar (across Panels A and B), our initial model (Panel A) could 
be underestimating the cross-border effect, since factors influencing the foreign deal 
decision appear to be negatively associated with the target CAR. Lasty, similar effects are 
recorded in Models (6) to (8) (across both panels A and B). 
Consistent with the negative relation between the target firm’s CAR and the acquirer 
pre-bid ownership in Models (5) to (8), there is a significant positive reaction of the acquirer 
CAR in Models (9) to (12) given the acquirer pre-bid ownership in the target. Therefore, 
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despite the overwhelming evidence from the literature that acquirer returns are mostly 
negative, the market reaction is positive when the acquirer has a prior ownership stake. This 
is consistent with our argument that the market views the pre-bid ownership as a value 
creating/adding element for the acquirer through the channel of cheaper purchase price 
offered to the target. We also find significant relation (mainly at 5% level) between acquirer 
CAR and our second option proxy (𝑑1) in Models (9) to (12), indicating that acquirers enjoy 
a positive market reaction when both merging firms possess real options or growth related 
options. In addition, CBA is significant in the Models (9) and (12) and the interaction 
variables between our real option measures and CBA are mainly insignificant (except in 
Model (12) where it is negative and marginally statistically significant). Lastly, in Model (9) 
(Panel B) the coefficient on the cross-border indicator is (1.022) is slightly smaller than the 
equivalent CBA coefficient in Model (9) (Panel A) and significant at the 5% level, while 
Lambda is positive and marginally statistically significant (7.228). While parameters of 
cross-border indicators appear similar (across Panels A and B), our initial model (Panel A) 
could be weakly overestimating the cross-border effect, since factors influencing the foreign 
deal appear to be positively associated, yet marginally statistically significant, with the 
acquirer CAR. Similar effects are recorded across the Models (10) to (12) (across both panels 
A and B). 
The significance of our control variables in Table 5 are generally consistent with the 
literature. There is mixed prior evidence on acquirer market reaction to CBA 
announcements.11 We find that in Models (9) to (12) that the acquirer market reaction is 
                                                             
11 Francis et al. (2008) find positive acquirers’ value gains surrounding announcements of CBA, but Gregory and 
McCorriston (2005) suggest there are no gains to acquirers. 
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positive for CBA (purchases of US targets). The significantly negative relationship between 
target size (𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑡−43)) and premia (Models (1) to (4)) or target CAR (Models (5) to (8)) 
indicate that larger targets receive lower premia.12 This is possibly due to lower merger 
synergies due to more difficult integration process between the merging firms, in particular 
when the target is a large firm. The coefficient for 𝑀𝐵𝐼𝐷 is generally statistically insignificant 
across all Models, which suggests that multiple bidders do not bid up the price for acquiring 
the target. As we control for the presence of pre-ownership of the acquirer in the target, the 
insignificant coefficient of 𝑀𝐵𝐼𝐷 might be due to the presence of more information in the 
deal’s process (as explained earlier in the paper) and hence the lack of aggressive bidding 
behavior. The coefficient for CASH is significantly negative in Models (1) to (4) and positive 
in Models (5) to (12). For Models (1) to (4) this supports the prediction that targets 
shareholders prefer cash and are willing to accept a smaller premia for cash deals relative to 
stock and mixed deals. The literature offers several contradicting perspectives on payment 
methods in M&As13 and we find that the market reaction to both the acquirer and the target 
is positive in cash deals. Among other potential explanations, the acquirer stock 
overvaluation could be associated with the higher market perception of cash financed deals, 
as reflected on the positive cash financed coefficient across Models (5) to (12).14 
 
                                                             
12 There is also a negative market reaction for the acquirer in Models (9) to (12) based on the target size 
(𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑡−43)). 
13 For example, Lin, Chou, and Cheng (2011) conclude that the magnitude of pre-acquisition misvaluation of the 
acquiring firm drives post-acquisition underperformance for stock deals. 
14 We have also tested whether conglomerate and horizontal mergers, as well as complementary resources 
merges, explain a greater variation of premia and target or acquirer CAR. Our results show that there is an 
insignificant effect. This is possibly due to the fact that the uncertainty embedded in different types of M&As is 
reduced by the information gained by holding a prior stake or growth-related options. Hence, when controlling 
for the presence of a real option, the effects of conglomerate, horizontal and complementary mergers remain 
insignificant. 
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4.4. Robustness checks 
4.4.1. The real option in M&As 
To provide evidence that our real option argument based on the Grullon et al. (2012) 
framework exists in the M&A setting, we provide some additional empirical analysis which 
we suggest it helps to provide support to the findings in this paper.15 We follow exactly the 
estimation procedure and the real option analysis in Grullon et al. (2012) for a sample US 
M&As from 1977 to 2014. After matching with additional financial data three years after the 
merger until 2014 to estimate post-merger real options, our sample has 4,315 deals. We find 
that firm level real options as reflected by positive regression coefficients do exist in our M&A 
sample as the real option proxies are significant and positively correlated with firm-level 
excess return. Next, we find that our real option proxy is positively correlated with various 
measures of investment (growth) opportunities and the classification of option-intensive 
industries for the acquirers by Grullon et al. (2012). This result indicates that the positive 
return-volatility relationship is stronger for firms in real option-intensive industries. To 
examine the time-series evolution of real options, we check whether the positive relation is 
expected to be weakened following events of real option exercise. From Year -3 to Year -1 we 
find that that real option level has reduced during this period. On the other hand, the target 
sample shows a relatively stable pattern during the same pre-merger period. More 
importantly, the coefficient for the targets one year prior to the merger (year -1) is 
significantly larger than that for the acquirers, indicating that the targets show a much higher 
real option level than the that of the acquirers immediately before the merger. Therefore we 
                                                             
15 For brevity we have not included this analysis in the paper but the tables are available on request from the 
authors. 
29 
 
suggest that acquirers suffer from a steady decline of real option during the pre-event years. 
Thus the acquirers are motivated to seek external injection of real option through M&As. 
In addition, in identifying the appropriate targets, it is reasonable for the acquirers to 
choose targets with a stable (instead of declining) and, more importantly higher level of real 
option. To further support our real option argument for M&As, we turn to the pre- and post-
event comparison of real option level for the acquirers. From year -1 to year +1, the return-
volatility coefficients for acquirers drop significantly. On the other hand, the return-volatility 
coefficients for the control group remain stable and high for the post-event years. These 
findings are consistent with Grullon et al. (2012), and suggests that firms exercise most of 
their real option through investing.  
To examine if that the significant drop of the coefficient is related to investment spike. 
We check the real investment rate changes of the acquiring firms immediately after the M&A 
event. We find that the acquirers’ investment rate (measured as the M&A transaction value 
divided by total assets) is on average 17.03%. This rate is significantly larger than the peer 
firms’ 5.81% investment rate for the same year (consistent when using different peer 
benchmarks). We can therefore conclude that the decline on the real options of the acquirers 
is associated with a corresponding increase in real investments. This finding is consistent 
with our conjecture that the acquirers exercise real option through the acquisitions. In order 
to show that the declination of acquirers’ coefficients in the prior merger period and the 
significant difference between acquirers’ and targets’ coefficients are not random effects, we 
further conduct a placebo test which indicates that the real option results are unique for M&A 
firms. In conclusion, we suggest that this analysis demonstrates that the real option 
argument we have does exist empirically in M&A activities. 
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4.4.2. Alternative event window 
In Table 5 we use the event window (𝑡 − 20, 𝑡 + 2) for the target CAR and the event window 
(𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 + 2) for the acquirer CAR. For the target CAR, the window (𝑡 − 20, 𝑡 + 2) could be 
problematic due to problems with the share price increases prior to the announcement of 
the M&As. To avoid this issue, we use various windows of target CAR, (𝑡 − 10, 𝑡 + 2), (𝑡 −
5, 𝑡 + 2), and (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1). For the acquirer CAR the established window in the literature is 
(𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 + 2) (see Fuller et al., 2002). However, we also use various windows [(𝑡 − 10, 𝑡 +
10), (𝑡 − 10, 𝑡 + 5), (𝑡 − 10, 𝑡 + 2), (𝑡 − 5, 𝑡 + 5), (𝑡 − 5, 𝑡 + 2), (𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1)] to confirm our 
main findings. In these alternative estimations (results are not reported but are available 
upon request from the authors) using the above windows for both the acquirer and target 
CAR, our results in Table 5 are quantitatively the same. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is that we apply real option arguments to understand the 
possible determinants of the takeover premia in M&As. We examine the extent to which real 
options affect the takeover premia in M&As through two deal and firm related characteristics: 
(a) pre-bid ownership, and (b) firm level risk-return sensitivity of merger-pairs. Firstly, we 
argue that pre-bid ownership is a form of real option purchased by the acquirer which can 
be exercised through a subsequent M&As transaction. The cost of the option is the percentage 
of the shares purchased initially. This real option allows the potential acquirers to gain access 
to privileged information and familiarity with senior management/decision makers in the 
target firm. This reduces the information asymmetry between the acquirer and target and 
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uncertainty in the post-acquisition value. If the acquirer decides to proceed with the full 
acquisition of the target (exercise their option). The familiarity with the target allows the 
acquirer to ‘negotiate’ a lower takeover premia and the reduction in uncertainty can mean 
that the offer price is more reflective of the true value of the target. 
Our first result supports this view, as we find that the takeover premia is lower for 
completed M&As, where there was a prior ownership stake. This argument is further 
supported when we measure the takeover premia as the target market reaction to the 
announcement, as contrary to the common finding that target shareholders benefit in the 
M&As, we find the target market reaction is lower in deals in which there is a pre-bid 
ownership of the target by the acquirer. This indicates that the market views the takeover 
premia to be reflective of the value of the target and reduces the gains to target shareholders. 
Secondly, based on positive risk-return sensitivity as our second real option proxy 
(Grullon et al., 2012) and the like-buys-like argument on firm level innovations (Bena and Li, 
2014) in merger incidence, we find that offer premia is higher when both the acquirer and 
target exhibit positive risk-return sensitivity. Consistent with the like-buys-like argument, 
the acquirer with real option is willing to pay a higher takeover premia for these option-
embedded targets. Combing these results, we conclude that a real-option intensive acquirer 
will pay higher premia to buy option-intensive target than to buy non-option intensive target, 
but pre-bid ownership stake effectively more than offsets the higher takeover premia in the 
subsequent acquisition of the target. 
These results provide evidence of real options having an impact on the takeover premia 
offered to targets in M&As. As CBAs have higher uncertainty than domestic transactions due 
to potentially greater information asymmetries and cultural differences, we also control for 
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the possible joint effect of these two real option variables in CBA versus domestic deals. We 
find that there is a higher takeover premia in CBA than domestic M&As, but there is no 
significant difference between CBA and domestic M&As when we include whether the 
acquirer has an initial stake in the target. 
Overall our results suggest that there is a clear role for real options in understanding 
the takeover premia in M&As. To develop this further, future research should consider 
different levels in prior ownership as a measure of the real option. Also the sample could be 
developed to consider international targets where there could be greater information 
asymmetry and cultural differences between the acquirers and targets. 
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Appendix 1 Variable definitions  
Variable Acronym Description Source 
Domestic DOM Dummy=0 if both firms are US. SDC 
Cross-Border 
Acquisition 
CBA 
Dummy=1 if the Acquirer is a non-US firm and the Target 
is a US firm. 
SDC 
Diversified/Focused DIV/FOC 
Dummy=1 when the acquirer and target do not share the 
same 2-digit code and Dummy=0 when the acquirer and 
target share the same 2-digit code (=FOC). 
SDC 
Cash Financed 
Transactions 
CASH 
Dummy=1 if the consideration is 100% financed with 
cash and Dummy=0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Stock Financed 
Acquisitions 
STOCK 
Dummy=1 when the consideration is 100% financed 
with stocks and Dummy=0 otherwise. 
SDC 
Transactions financed 
with a mixture of cash 
and stock 
MIXED 
Dummy = 1 when the deal is financed with a mixture of 
cash and stock and Dummy=0 otherwise. 
SDC 
No Pre-bid ownership 
No- Preown 
(NPO) 
No pre-bid ownership prior to completed M&A SDC 
Pre-bid ownership 
Yes-Preown 
(YPO) 
Pre-bid ownership present prior to M&A. SDC 
Pre-bid Ownership PreOwn 
Dummy which equals 1 if pre-bid ownership exists 
before M&A and 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Real option Dummy d1 
Dummy=1 if both acquirer and target real option 
coefficient is positive, and Dummy=0 otherwise (real 
option as captured by 𝑟𝑖,𝜏  in equation 5. For more 
information see section 3.3.2). 
Grullon et al. 
(2012) & Eq. 5 
Deal Value DV Reported deal value, in millions of dollars. SDC 
Premia Offered to the 
Target 
PREM 
refers to the acquisition premia based on Equation (1), 
section 3.2.1 
Datastream & 
SDC 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns 
CAR 
The sum of the acquirer’s (𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅 ) or target’s (𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑅 ) 
abnormal returns in the specified window surrounding 
the announcement. 
Datastream & 
SDC 
Target cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) 
TCAR refers to target 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡 − 20, 𝑡 + 2), in %. 
Datastream & 
SDC 
Acquirer cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) 
ACAR 
refers to acquirer 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 + 2), in %. 
 
Datastream & 
SDC 
Market Value of the 
Target’s Equity 
TMV 
Target’s market value of equity at 43 trading days prior 
to bid announcement, in millions dollars. We also employ 
the natural logarithm of this variable. 
Datastream 
Market Value of the 
Acquirer’s Equity 
AMV 
Acquirer’s market value of equity at 20 trading days prior 
to bid announcement, in millions dollars. We also employ 
the natural logarithm of this variable. 
Datastream 
Acquirer cash ratio ACASH_RATIO 
Acquirer’s ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets in the quarter prior to the announcement of the 
deal. 
Datastream 
Acquirer debt/equity ALEV_RATIO 
Acquirer’s total debt as a percentage of common equity 
value during the quarter prior to the announcement of 
the deal. 
Datastream 
Acquirer Market-to-
Book Value 
AMTBV 
Acquirer’s ratio of market value over book value of equity 
(measured 20 days prior to the deal’s announcement). 
Datastream 
Target cash ratio TCASH_RATIO 
Target’s ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets in the quarter prior to the announcement of the 
deal. 
Datastream 
Target debt/equity TLEV_RATIO 
Target’s total debt as a percentage of common equity 
value during the quarter prior to the announcement of 
the deal. 
Datastream 
Target Market-to-Book 
Value 
TMTBV 
Target’s ratio of market value over book value of equity 
(measured 43 days prior to the deal’s announcement). 
Datastream 
Multiple bidders MBID 
Dummy=1 if the number of bidders is more than 1, and 
Dummy=0 otherwise. 
Datastream 
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Table 1 Annual distribution of the sampled 
 
The sample consists of completed M&A of US targets announced by US and non-US listed firms between 01/01/1985 and 31/12/2006 and recorded by the Security Data 
Corporation (SDC) that satisfy our selection criteria. The definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
Year FULL 
SAMPLE 
DOM CBA FOC DIV CASH STOCK MIXED NPO YPO d1 DV PREM 
(%) 
TCAR ACAR 
1985 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 6,605 97.47 18.44 4.98 
1986 38 32 6 19 19 32 3 3 29 9 25 448 44.41 28.17 0.60 
1987 42 30 12 18 24 31 2 9 15 27 25 245 41.65 21.78 -0.43 
1988 77 53 24 30 47 54 8 15 50 27 30 360 62.68 30.15 -0.13 
1989 60 40 20 29 31 40 13 7 40 20 27 637 48.04 23.40 -0.43 
1990 38 33 5 17 21 20 12 6 30 8 17 355 61.80 29.44 0.53 
1991 27 26 1 12 15 8 11 8 21 6 8 142 62.44 28.97 -2.22 
1992 29 29 0 18 11 10 8 11 16 13 8 177 58.57 29.73 1.72 
1993 39 37 2 22 17 10 15 14 31 8 12 561 60.08 19.03 -0.81 
1994 51 40 11 27 24 19 21 11 41 10 12 929 58.50 26.26 -0.92 
1995 95 87 8 57 38 33 38 24 77 18 32 545 57.09 25.48 -1.37 
1996 114 100 14 64 50 25 54 35 93 21 36 784 56.10 26.47 -0.50 
1997 155 139 16 88 67 39 62 54 140 15 51 596 65.51 24.73 -0.66 
1998 167 143 24 103 64 53 62 52 149 18 51 1,378 60.30 28.22 -1.76 
1999 181 147 34 102 79 73 60 48 157 24 58 1,636 70.76 33.60 0.16 
2000 160 123 37 88 72 54 58 48 142 18 53 1,409 60.13 37.03 -2.61 
2001 120 102 18 74 46 37 51 32 108 12 26 1,103 62.53 37.72 -0.92 
2002 60 54 6 36 24 30 20 10 50 10 11 1,504 63.85 41.25 -1.92 
2003 97 83 14 68 29 43 22 32 86 11 18 828 63.28 33.22 -2.57 
2004 85 74 11 56 29 39 20 26 81 4 14 981 53.81 26.24 -2.00 
2005 102 86 16 66 36 51 18 33 94 8 18 2,319 50.87 27.90 -0.13 
2006 101 82 19 53 48 67 11 23 96 5 23 2,741 44.16 26.16 0.52 
Total 1,839 1,541 298 1,048 791 769 569 501 1,547 292 556 26,283 - - - 
% of All - 84% 16% 57% 43% 42% 31% 27% 84% 16% 30% - - - - 
Average - - - - - - - - -  - 1,195 59.27 28.34 -0.49 
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
 
The sample consists of completed M&A of US targets announced by US and non-US listed firms between 01/01/1985 and 31/12/2006 and recorded by the Security Data 
Corporation (SDC) that satisfy our selection criteria. The definition of each variable can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
Panel A 
  PREM (%) ACAR (%) TCAR (%) DV in $million TMV in $million AMV in $million 
 N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Full Sample 1,839 58.98 56.40 -0.91 -0.66 29.64 26.34 1,129 182 825 152 13,481 1,869 
Domestic (DOM) 1,541 58.04 56.10 -1.21 -0.84 28.86 25.93 1,170 178 855 146 13,961 1,715 
Cross Border 
(CBA) 298 63.84 57.43 0.62 0.42 33.68 27.56 918 210 670 180 10,999 2,668 
Focused (FOC) 1,048 59.56 57.50 -1.28 -0.94 28.50 24.92 1,359 221 983 180 11,682 1,790 
Diversified (DIV) 791 58.21 54.14 -0.42 -0.35 31.15 28.02 825 147 615 121 15,864 2,076 
Cash (CASH) 769 53.95 52.11 0.89 0.40 36.06 31.84 479 131 439 115 16,767 2,209 
Mixed (MIXED) 501 68.21 65.78 -0.79 -0.72 24.06 21.39 1,768 277 1,174 218 11,941 2,264 
Stock (STOCK) 569 57.65 56.45 -3.45 -2.66 25.87 24.34 1,445 235 1,040 164 10,395 1,330 
No PreOwn  1,547 60.78 57.57 -1.22 -0.84 30.47 27.63 1,265 220 868 152 14,144 1,929 
Yes PreOwn  292 49.47 47.88 0.75 0.23 25.24 20.18 407 49 599 146 9,966 1,510 
d1 556 61.71 58.69 -0.14 -0.58 32.12 27.10 1,240 153 892 120 9,274 1,362 
 
Panel B 
 Measure=𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 Measure=𝑑1 
   𝑁𝑜 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 
 PreOwn/ 
All(%) 𝐴𝑙𝑙  𝑑1 𝑑1/𝐴𝑙𝑙(%) 
Full Sample 1,839 1,547 292 16% 1,839 556 30% 
Domestic 1,541 1,327 214 14% 1541 443 29% 
CBA 298 220 78 26% 298 113 38% 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix of main variables.  
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
ACAR (1) 1.00                                   
TCAR (2) 0.11 1.00                                 
PREM (3) -0.03 0.40 1.00                               
𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 (4) 0.08 -0.07 -0.10 1.00                             
𝑑1 (5) 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 1.00                           
CBA (6) 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.07 1.00                         
DIV (7) 0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 1.00                       
CASH (8) 0.16 0.19 -0.10 0.19 0.02 0.19 0.13 1.00                     
TMV (9) -0.07 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 1.00                   
AMV (10) 0.00 0.08 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.08 0.24 1.00                 
DV (11) -0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.13 0.96 0.22 1.00               
TMTBV (12) -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.10 0.06 1.00             
AMTBV (13) 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 1.00           
TCASH_RATIO (14) -0.11 0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.24 -0.02 0.08 0.04 1.00         
TLEV_RATIO (15) 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 1.00       
ACASH_RATIO (16) -0.13 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.39 -0.03 1.00     
ALEV_RATIO (17) 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 1.00   
MBID (18) 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 1.00 
 
Notes: This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between all the variables used in our analysis. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4 Univariate Analysis of Premia 
 
Acquisition premia based on Equation (1) for all deals, as well as deals grouped by the target firm’s 
domicile, and pre-bid ownership of shares of the target by the acquirer, and also difference in premia 
from: (a) absence versus existence of pre-bid ownership, and (b) domestic and CBA deals, are 
presented. ALL refers to the total of sample deals; Domestic refers to domestic deals; CBA refers to 
foreign deals; No PreOwn refers to no pre-bid ownership prior to the M&A; Yes PreOwn refers to 
existing ownership prior to the M&A. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1, 5, 10 percent respectively. 
 
 
All 𝑵𝒐 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝑶𝒘𝒏 𝒀𝒆𝒔 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝑶𝒘𝒏 
𝑵𝒐 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝑶𝒘𝒏 
vs. 
𝒀𝒆𝒔 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝑶𝒘𝒏 
Panel A: All (Prem defined in Eq. 1) 
Mean 58.98a 60.78a 49.47a 11.31a 
Median 56.40a 57.57a 47.88a 9.69a 
N 1,839 1,547 292  
Panel B1: Domestic (Prem defined in Eq. 1) 
Mean 58.04a 60.10a 45.31a 14.79a 
Median 56.10a 57.46a 43.54a 13.92a 
N 1,541 1,327 214  
Panel B2: Domestic (Target CAR(𝒕 − 𝟐𝟎, 𝒕 + 𝟐) defined in Eq. 3) 
Mean 28.86a 29.82a 22.92a 6.90a 
Median 25.93a 27.09a 18.72a 8.37a 
N 1,541 1,327 214  
Panel B3: Domestic (Acquirer CAR(𝒕 − 𝟐, 𝒕 + 𝟐) defined in Eq. 3) 
Mean -1.21  -1.47a 0.43 -1.90a 
Median -0.84 -0.94a -0.12 -0.82a 
N 1,541 1,327 214  
Panel C1: CBA (Premia defined in Eq. 1) 
Mean 63.84a 64.89a 60.87a 4.02 
Median 57.43a 60.69a 52.51a 8.18 
N 298 220 78  
Panel C2: CBA (Target CAR(𝒕 − 𝟐𝟎, 𝒕 + 𝟐) defined in Eq. 3) 
Mean 33.68a 34.41a 31.59a 2.82 
Median 27.56a 29.09a 23.88a 5.21c 
N 298 220 78  
Panel C3: CBA (Acquirer CAR(𝒕 − 𝟐, 𝒕 + 𝟐) defined in Eq. 3) 
Mean 0.62 0.26a 1.65b -1.39c 
Median 0.42 -0.02 0.64 -0.66c 
N 298 220 78  
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Table 5 Multiple regression analysis on the Takeover Premia, Target CAR, and Acquirer CAR 
 
Panel A reports the results from the multivariate analysis on acquisition premia (as defined in equation 1) and announcement period market-adjusted 
abnormal returns of targets and acquirers (as defined in equation 3) are regressed on a set of explanatory variables. Panel B reports the corresponding 
𝜆𝐶𝐵𝐴  for each model in Panel A after correcting for self-selection in the choice of firms to conduct CBAs or not. Equation (4) is estimated using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method. The intercept (𝛼𝑖,𝑡
1  ) measures premia and targets’ or acquirers’ abnormal returns after accounting for the effects of 
explanatory variables. The dependent variable is regressed against a set of explanatory variables which include toehold investment, 𝑑1 dummy, 𝐶𝐵𝐴 
dummy, diversifying M&A dummy, log of acquirer size, log of deal value, target and acquirer MTBV, target and acquire acquirer cash ratio, target and 
acquirer debt/equity (leverage) ratio, multiple bid dummy, cash financing dummy, and year fixed effects. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix 
1. In Panel B, 𝜆𝐶𝐵𝐴  refers to the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) from the Heckman two-stage model. a, b, and c indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 
 Takeover Premia (Equation 1) Target 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡 − 20, 𝑡 + 2) (Equation 3) Acquirer 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑡 − 2, 𝑡 + 2) (Equation 3) 
Panel A – Regression models 
Model   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛 -9.385a -11.032a -9.342a -10.031a -5.945a -6.727a -5.908a -5.407a  1.198b  1.165c  1.198b  1.424a 
𝑑1  4.295b  4.234b  5.581b  3.958c  4.195a  4.165a  5.300a  4.476a  1.039b  1.038b  1.050c  1.158b 
                                               𝐶𝐵𝐴  8.863a  7.274a  11.443a  8.257a  2.937c  2.183  5.157b  3.441c  0.993b  0.961c  1.015c  1.205a 
       𝐷𝐼𝑉 -2.241 -2.145 -2.364 -2.175  0.007  0.053 -0.099 -0.049 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010 -0.032 
𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛  𝐶𝐵𝐴    6.747        3.201        0.136     
𝑑1  𝐶𝐵𝐴     -7.162       -6.160c       -0.060   
𝑑1  𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛  𝐶𝐵𝐴        6.404       -5.337       -2.241c 
𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑀𝑉−20)  3.844
a  3.803a  3.866a  3.805a  3.028a  3.008a  3.046a  3.060a  0.166  0.165  0.166  0.179 
𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑡−43) -4.457
a -4.424a -4.502a -4.428a -5.076a -5.061a -5.115a -5.100a -0.825a -0.824a -0.825a -0.835a 
𝐴𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑡−20 -1.564 -1.526 -1.772 -1.491 -2.456 -2.438 -2.635 -2.517 -0.038 -0.037 -0.040 -0.063 
𝑇𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑡−43 -1.086 -1.061 -1.074 -1.093 -2.210 -2.198 -2.199 -2.204 -0.398 -0.398 -0.398 -0.396 
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 -6.886 -7.070 -6.780 -7.008  6.941c  6.854c  7.033c  7.043c -4.922a -4.925a -4.921a -4.879a 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 -11.442b -11.456b -11.646b -11.449b -0.837 -0.843 -1.012 -0.831 -3.828a -3.828a -3.829a -3.825a 
𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 -0.232b -0.236b -0.231b -0.234b -0.091 -0.093 -0.090 -0.090 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 
𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑉_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂  0.061a  0.061a  0.061a  0.061a -0.013b -0.013b -0.013b -0.013b  0.007a  0.007a  0.007a  0.007a 
𝑀𝐵𝐼𝐷  4.695  4.836  4.744  4.724 -0.763 -0.696 -0.722 -0.787  0.134  0.137  0.134  0.124 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 -11.787a -11.638a -11.689a -11.746a  8.351a  8.422a  8.436a  8.317a  2.280a  2.283a  2.281a  2.265a 
Intercept  60.986a  61.196a  60.828a  61.176a  25.000a  25.100a  24.864a  24.841a  0.334  0.338  0.333  0.267 
YFE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-Stat  6.75a  6.45a  6.48a  6.41a  15.08a  14.28a  14.43a  14.30a  7.83a  7.31a  7.59a  7.48a 
R-squared (in %)  5.93  5.99  6.02  5.96  12.34  12.37  12.49  12.39  6.81  6.88  6.49  6.29 
N  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839  1,839 
Panel B – Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) from the Heckman two-stage model 
                                                𝐶𝐵𝐴 8.394a 6.791b 10.774a 7.669a  2.707  1.947  4.830c  3.156c  1.022b  0.991c  1.056c  1.242a 
𝜆𝐶𝐵𝐴 -117.829
a -117.864a -117.398a -118.322a -57.729a -57.745a -57.344a -57.424a  7.228c  7.227c  7.234c  7.377c 
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Figure 1 Annual distribution of deals according to the pre-bid ownership level (from Table 1) 
 
NPO: No pre-bid ownership prior to completed M&A. 
YPO: Pre-bid ownership present prior to M&A. 
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